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Levinas’s “Face” and
“Other” in Dostoevsky’s
The Idiot
Embodiment and Betrayal
Hannah Vinchur

Famously known for returning ethics to the field of theory, Emmanuel Levinas often looks to great works of literature to illustrate his
philosophies. One text Levinas uses consistently is Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov, as Levinas quotes it directly in Ethics and Infinity (98).
The relationship between Dostoevsky and Levinas has been written about for
years, and many scholars have expanded on this connection between Levinas’s
theories and The Brothers Karamazov, particularly in regard to Levinas’s theory
of the “face.” However, few articles have been written about Levinas’s “face” in
The Idiot. This is surprising as Val Vinokurov argues, “almost every one of his
[Dostoevsky’s] novels is really a series of face-to-face encounters” (23). If we
accept Vinokurov’s claim of the “series of face-to-face encounters,” then The
Idiot should display Levinas’s principles as well. In fact, of Dostoevsky’s works,
The Idiot may be the best representative of Levinas’s theory of the “face.” By
reading The Idiot through Levinas’s theory of the “face” and the responsibility it entails, we see that not only does Prince Myshkin perfectly embody the
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execution of Levinas’s theory, but the continued violation of this theory drives
the plot of the novel. As a result of this continued violation, Myshkin becomes
a victim of others violating the “face,” as he is placed in a position in which, no
matter what he does, he violates the “face,” becoming a perpetrator himself.
In order to understand how Myshkin fulfills Levinas’s theory of the “face,”
we must first understand the theory. Levinas describes the function of the “face”
as, “it requires me. The face looks at me, calls out to me. It claims me. What does
it ask for? . . . responsibility for the other” (Alterity and Transcendence 163). The
“other” is “the right of the other man. A right with respect to which I am never
released! Hence infinite responsibility for the other” (127). Furthermore, “The
first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at
the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do
all and to whom I owe all . . . I am he who finds the resources to respond to the
call” (Ethics and Infinity 89). In its simplest terms, the “face” of another person,
of an “other,” requires complete accountability, care, and concern for it. The
“face” shows that we have an ethical responsibility for “others,” hence the “Thou
shalt not kill.” The “face” is also a vehicle for vulnerability, in its “destitut[ion].”
It is an undeniable responsibility for “others” and a requirement of morality; it
is the epitome of putting “others’” needs above your own. In the “face” we see
the basic humanity of people and their fundamental rights as humans.
In an 1896 letter to his friend Maikov, Dostoevsky describes an idea he has
for an upcoming novel, which would become The Idiot; “This idea is—to portray a wholly beautiful individual” (Mochulsky 344). If we extend this idea of
applying Levinas’s theory to Dostoevsky’s novel, this would mean Myshkin is
the perfect embodiment or fulfillment of honoring Levinas’s “face.” Vinokurov
argues that Myshkin’s “relationship to the face has more to do with emotion”
(24) than anything else, and as we move through The Idiot, we will see that
Myshkin is always obligated to the “other,” and it drives and controls his every
action.
Dostoevsky immediately establishes Myshkin’s fascination and obligation
to “faces” in Myshkin’s first encounter with the Epanchin women. In her article,
“The Face of the Other in Idiot,” Leslie A. Johnson observes that Adelaida immediately senses within Myshkin an ability to “see” and that Myshkin can teach
her to “see,” too (869). The direct line reads, “I don’t know how to look . . .
The prince did learn to look abroad” (Dostoevsky 58). Mrs. Epanchin immediately bristles, wondering what Adelaida means by being unable to look, “What
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do you mean, you don’t know how to look? You have eyes, so look” (58). Mrs.
Epanchin misses the intuition Adelaida feels in Myshkin and his ability to look
beyond the physical and see within an individual—to be called by and obligated
to someone’s “face.” Johnson claims, “what the prince has come to teach is a way
of seeing the human face” (869). His purpose in the novel is to exemplify what
honoring someone’s “otherness” is—what the true honoring of the “face” is.
Furthermore, Adelaida is surprised when Myshkin suggests she paint a physical
face, as “Had the prince suggested a landscape, a still life, even a portrait, then
Adelaida, that artistic daughter of good family and amiable disposition, would
have known how to see it. The genre would have specified the tropes by which
she could thematize and appropriate her subject” (869). Myshkin, by delving
deeper into a physical face and its meaning, rather than just staying surface
level, brings an entirely new perspective to the Epanchins, one utterly different
from what they are used to.
However, as Adelaida cannot approach painting in the new manner
Myshkin suggests, she asks several questions, “How should the face be portrayed? As just a face? What sort of face?” (Dostoevsky 63). Surprisingly, rather
than describing the physical features of the face he proposes, Myshkin describes
the emotions and thoughts of a man before his execution, quite different from
what Adelaida was expecting (64–66). Myshkin’s description shows that, once
again, he sees beyond the physical into the humanity of a person. Myshkin does
not describe a detached, merely physical representation of a person, but rather
the emotional, humane state of a person. Vinokurov supports this idea in his
article “The End of Consciousness and the Ends of Consciousness: A Reading
of Dostoevsky's The Idiot and Demons After Levinas” by saying, “Myshkin is
someone who only truly loves persons as manifestations of an iconic meta-face
and not as concrete and individual faces” (25). Vinokurov reemphasizes what
we already know from Levinas, that Myshkin sees beyond a person’s physical
face to the humanity that requires infinite respect and obligation from other
humans. Myshkin does not focus on the physical but on the “meta,” what cannot be seen and what is beyond the physical face. Myshkin always sees and feels
obligation toward Levinas’s “other,” and “holds himself responsible before it”
(Johnson 869). At one point, Myshkin states he knows the Epanchin girls’ faces,
refusing to expound when asked for details, so we do not know if he refers to the
physical or metaphysical face (Dostoevsky 66). However, from his insights with
Adelaida and our knowledge of Levinas, we can determine that Myshkin has
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already seen into the humanity and hearts of the Epanchins, seeing their “faces”
and feeling obligated and called by all of them to put their needs above his own.
An ideal example of Myshkin’s devotion to the “face” and the “other” is his
story with Marie. While no explicit references to the “face” appear in this section of the novel, Myshkin’s actions align with his later treatment of Nastasya
Filippovna and fulfilling the role of honoring Levinas’s “face” and “other.”
Myshkin begins his love of Marie with a kiss, telling her “that I had kissed her
not because I was in love with her but because I felt very sorry for her, and that
from the very start I had never regarded her as guilty but only as unfortunate”
(70). Myshkin’s actions stem from his moral obligation and pity to the “other”
he sees in Marie. This total obligation and answer to a call from Marie’s “face”
cause Myshkin to speak with the children and change their attitude toward her.
The children no longer tease and abuse Marie, instead they visit her while she
is sick “to embrace and kiss her” (71). Myshkin’s love and obligation to Marie,
although it stems from pity, inspires the children, and because of their kindness,
Marie “died almost happy . . . [even though] till the very end she considered
herself a great criminal” (73). Myshkin sees Marie’s true “face,” and with the
help of the children, fulfills the obligation her “otherness” deserves. In addition,
after this story, Myshkin reveals that because of his experience with Marie and
the children he is “very attentive to faces now” and proceeds to describe each
of the Epanchin daughters’ personalities through their physical faces, further
demonstrating his perceptiveness of the “other” through the objective face (75).
However, the most significant and influential “face” relation in The Idiot
is between Nastasya Filippovna and Myshkin’s strong reaction to her portrait.
Of her portrait, Myshkin says, “‘An astonishing face!’ ‘And I’m convinced that
her fate is no ordinary one. It’s a gay face, but she has suffered terribly, eh? It
speaks in her eyes, those two little bones, the two points under her eyes where
the cheeks begin” (36). Myshkin’s assessment of Nastasya’s physical face is
unique because he discerns her character and her life through it, unlike any of
the other characters in the novel. Adelaida sees the power of Nastasya’s beauty
while Totsky, General Epanchin, Rogozhin, and Ganya all see opportunity
in Nastasya’s physical face, but Myshkin is the only one who sees who she is
through her objective face, seeing her “face” (80). Later at a party that evening,
Myshkin says to Nastasya, “I saw your portrait today, and it was as if I recognized a familiar face. It seemed to me at once as if you had already called me”
(168). Again, we see the return to Levinas in Myshkin’s words and in his actions.
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Later in the novel, Myshkin again recounts his initial encounter with
Nastasya’s portrait, “I was looking at her face! That morning, in her portrait,
I already couldn’t bear it” (582). At the end of their conversation, Evgeny
Pavlovich wonders, “what was the meaning of this face that he [Myshkin] was
afraid of and that he loved so much” (583–4). In Nastasya Filippovna, Myshkin
sees the violation of the “face” she has endured by the men in her life, and
he feels the pull and obligation of Levinas’s theory to help her. Myshkin sees
beyond the physical attributes of Nastasya to her right as a human for proper
treatment. In Levinas’s terms, Nastasya’s “face” calls Myshkin to his responsibility, and he responds by offering her a way out of depravity through marriage,
even when he does not know her besides her portrait. Myshkin stays true to
that promise to Nastasya, even as he acknowledges that he does not love her
but only pities her (168; 589).
The final event of the novel that shows how Myshkin embodies Levinas’s
theory of the “face” is Myshkin’s reaction to Nastasya’s murder by Rogozhin.
Levinas says, “The first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ It is an order.
There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke
to me” (Ethics and Infinity 89). The first function of the “face” is to call us to
humanity, to resist the taking of life. When this fundamental principle of the
“face” is violated, Myshkin’s health relapses (613). In fact, immediately upon seeing Nastasya’s dead body, Myshkin begins “trembling” and Rogozhin asks if he
is likely to have a “fit” associated with his “disorder” (607). Being so closely associated with murder, with such a violent violation of the “face,” Myshkin cannot
recover. Even while he is with Rogozhin, Myshkin’s legs cease to function “from
fear,” he says (608). The violation of the “face” literally makes Myshkin physically and mentally unwell.
Unfortunately, because Myshkin’s character is the attempt “to portray a
wholly beautiful individual” and the embodiment of Levinas’s theory of the
“face,” it means that every other character in the novel is not in this “wholly beautiful” state. Characters’ constant violation of “faces” and “otherness” drives the
plot of The Idiot, eventually placing Myshkin in a situation where he becomes a
violator of the “face” himself. The first instance of this occurs with Totsky’s violation of Nastasya’s Filippovna’s “face” in her youth. Nastasya’s forced position
as Totsky’s mistress sets up the plot for Totsky and General Epanchin wanting
Ganya to marry Nastasya so Totsky can marry Alexandra. Nastasya is only seen
as a problem to be solved, instead of an “other” that demands infinite responsibility and respect. Not only is Nastasya’s “otherness” violated by Totsky, it is
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additionally violated by General Epanchin, Ganya, and Rogozhin through their
endless deal-making and auctioning of her, as in the party scene at Nastasya’s
(41; 49; 160–161). None of these men actually want Nastasya for who she truly is
but for what they can gain from her. Rogozhin claims to love her, but it is really
only dangerous passion, as Myshkin comments, “He’d marry her, and a week
later he might well put a knife in her” (37). Nastasya is merely a bargaining
commodity for them and a means to get what they want.
This shuffling of people in and out of marriage proposals creates a breeding ground for the violation of the “face,” as few of these people actually want
to be married to their chosen partners. For example, Ganya entangles Myshkin
in his desired relationship with Aglaya. As Aglaya observes to Myshkin, “he
knows and yet hesitates; he knows and still asks for a guarantee. He’s unable to
make a decision on faith . . . he wants me to give him hope in me” (84). Rather
than wanting to be with Aglaya because he loves her, Ganya simply wants a way
out of his engagement to Nastaya Filioppovna because he has come to despise
Nastasya. By disrespecting his responsibility to Aglaya’s “otherness,” Ganya creates an environment in which Myshkin and Aglaya become friends, allowing
Myshkin and Aglaya to form the bond that sets Myshkin up to fail in upholding
his perfect “otherness” to all. If Myshkin had not come to know and love Aglaya,
he would not have to choose between Aglaya and Nastasya.
Furthermore, although Nastasya “did not consider herself guilty of anything,” the impact of Totsky violating her “face” when she was younger shows
itself in her inability to follow through with Myshkin’s offer of marriage (49).
Despite her assertions of innocence, Nastasya leaves Myshkin twice, once minutes before their wedding, and with Rogozhin multiple times. Rogozhin tells
Myshkin, “she thinks it’s impossible for her to marry you, because she’d supposedly disgrace you and ruin your whole life. ‘I’m you-know-what,’ she says. To this
day she maintains it herself.” Rogozhin goes on to say, “She ran away from you
then, because she suddenly realized how much she loves you. It was beyond her
to be with you . . . So she wants to marry me out of spite” (215–216). Nastasya
herself states, “I’m not worthy of him [Myshkin]” in her conflict with Aglaya
(570). Despite her attempts to distance herself from her past, Nastasya cannot
allow herself happiness with Myshkin because she does not believe herself worthy enough to be with him, despite the fact that she is the victim of her “otherness” being violated. She is sincerely convinced of her unworthiness of Myshkin
and cannot imagine someone honoring her personhood and humanity because
all she has experienced is violation from the men in her life, as demonstrated
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by the party scene earlier in the novel, where the men basically auction her off.
Nastasya’s inability to commit to Myshkin drives the plot because it dictates
where Myshkin goes (he follows her all over Russia) and influences with whom
he interacts, as seen with Nastasya’s correspondence with Aglaya.
Nastasya actively tries to destroy any possibility of her “face” receiving
its proper respect by writing to Aglaya, urging Aglaya to marry Myshkin as
an attempt to remove Nastasya’s opportunity for happiness (568). Nastasya’s
inability to accept Myshkin because of Totsky violating her “face” as a young
woman causes Nastasya to push Aglaya and Myshkin’s relationship, hoping that
once Myshkin is married Nastasya can be free of the possibility of her own happiness. However, Myshkin’s obligation to Nastasya while being pushed toward
Aglaya places Myshkin in a position where he must violate a “face”—either
Nastasya or Aglaya’s.
The crucial moment comes when Aglaya, determined to assert herself in
the situation, visits Nastasya Filippovna’s home. At the end of their confrontation, both women look to Myshkin, expecting him to make his choice between
the two. Myshkin, however, does not see a choice between two women who love
him, but the never-ending call of one “face” in particular.
But he may not have understood all the force of this challenge, even
certainly did not, one may say. He only saw before him the desperate, insane face, because of which, as he had once let slip to Aglaya, ‘his
heart was forever pierced.’ He could no longer bear it and with an entreaty and reproach turned to Aglaya, pointing to Nastasya Filippovna:
“It’s not possible! She’s . . . so unhappy!” (571)

Seeing his betrayal in choosing Nastasya’s “face” over Aglaya’s in Aglaya’s reaction as she “covered her face with her hands,” Myshkin immediately tries to
comfort Aglaya, but he is stopped by Nastasya clutching him from behind (572).
Nastasya then occupies all his attention in her hysterics, “stroking her dear
head and face with both hands, like a little child” (572).
However, Myshkin cannot endure his having to choose one “face” over
another, and we see his turmoil in his conversation with Evgeny Pavlovich. In
his conversation with Evgeny, we see, “The prince is simply profligate toward the
face, and thus unable to live with the politics, the agony and violence of choosing between faces” (Vinokurov 28). Myshkin cannot live with his having to make
a choice between two “faces”—his inability to honor both Nastasya and Aglaya
at the same time. Myshkin consistently insists that Aglaya will “understand . . .
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She’ll understand that it’s all not that, but something completely, completely
different!” (582). Myshkin again references his marrying Nastasya Filippovna
because “she wants it” and how he “couldn’t bear Nastasya Filippovna’s face”
when the two women demanded he choose between them (582). Furthermore,
Myshkin claims he wants to love both of them, again insisting that Aglaya will
“understand.” Asking, “Can she really still have the same face as when she ran
out?” (583). Here we see Myshkin’s vain belief that other people respond to the
“face” as he does, and Evgeny censures him by saying, “Aglaya Ivanovna loved as
a woman, as a human being, not as . . . an abstract spirit” (583). Myshkin cannot
understand Aglaya’s love because he does not love selfishly. He only loves in
obligation and responsibility to the “face” and “other,” whereas those around
him continually violate the “face” he honors consistently.
Myshkin also sees his betrayal in Nastasya’s “face” as he continues to meet,
in an attempt to repair the damage after choosing Nastasya, with the Epanchins.
“He noticed, however, that Nastasya Filippovna knew and understood only too
well what Aglaya meant to him. She did not say anything, but he saw her ‘face’
at those times when she occasionally caught him, in the beginning, on the
point of going to the Epanchins’” (590). This section is particularly significant
because Dostoevsky places quotations around “face,” indicating its significance.
Myshkin is not just seeing Nastasya’s physical face here, but her deep unhappiness that he cannot fully honor her “face” while trying to honor Aglaya’s, as well.
By trying to be fully responsible and honorable to both “faces,” Myshkin ends
up unfulfilling both.
The last and ultimate violation of the “face,” as discussed earlier, is
Rogozhin’s murder of Nastasya Filippovna. Referring to the Hans Holbein painting discussed in the novel, “The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb,” Johnson
claims this painting “prompts us to ponder not only the meaning of the mortal
body, but the meaning of a violated face as well” (868). While Nastasya’s body
does not physically resemble Christ in the brutality of the wounds, her “face”
and “otherness” have been just as cruelly abused. This abuse drives the plot of
the novel as Nastasya becomes the figure around whom all the characters’ lives
center. Without the violation of her “face” by Totsky at the beginning of her life,
much of the novel would never have happened.
Myshkin’s failure to save Nastasya may cause some readers to question
whether Myshkin even embodies the honoring of the “face” through Levinas’s
terms, or if Dostoevsky succeeds in “portray[ing] a wholly beautiful individual”
(Mochulsky 344). However, what Dostoevsky shows us through Nastasya’s death
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is that Myshkin is attentive to the needs of the “face” to the very end. Myshkin
stays with Rogozhin, now a murderer, in order to keep Rogozhin calm throughout the night, “caressing and soothing” his physical face until they are discovered (Dostoevsky 611). Even after the tragedy of Nastasya’s death, Myshkin still
answers the call of the “face” and the “other” before him, Rogozhin. Rather than
leaving Rogozhin and reporting him to the police, Myshkin stays with him all
night to “quietly touch his head, his hair, stroke it and stroke his cheeks” (611).
Myshkin even loves the murderer’s “face.”
Through Myshkin and his acts in The Idiot, we see the fulfillment of
Levinas’s theory of the “face,” as it calls Myshkin to his supreme responsibility to humanity. Although Dostoevsky wrote The Idiot before Levinas’s theory,
they both seem to be asking similar questions about humanity and our obligation to each other. Through his character of Myshkin, Dostoevsky encourages
us to look continually outward and answer to the humanity of the people surrounding us, seeing them as they truly are and the level of respect they deserve.
By applying Dostoevsky’s and Levinas’s principles, we have the potential to
become perfectly whole and beautiful, just like Myshkin.
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